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March 2, 1981

Honorable Richard J. Maughan
Chief Justice
Supreme Court
State Capitol Building, #332
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Stromquist v. Clifford Cockayne, et al,
Case No. 16790
Stromquist v. Milton Yorgason, et al.,
Case No. 16919 - Supplemental Brief

Dear Justice Maughan:
Pursuant to the Court's Per Curiam Decision filed
February 9, 1981, I prepared and filed a Supplemental Brief
on the question of standing as requested by the Court.
However, in discussing the contents of my brief with Mr.
Brian Barnard, attorney for the Strornquists, I find that
I have made a mistake in the Supplemental Brief which has
been filed with the Court on the 27th day of February, 1981.
On page 3 of my argument, I quote from the decision of
Judge croft. That quote comes from Judge Croft's second decision
in the third Stromquist case rather than the decision of Judge
Croft in the second Stromquist case. The third Stromquist
case is not presently before the court but only Stromquist 1 & 2.
/Stromquist 3 from which the quoted language has been taken was
decided by the trial Judge but is not on appeal. On page 6,
sentences 1 & 2, I make reference again to Judge Croft's
decision. And finally, in my conclusion, I request affirmance
of the decisions of the lower court and in particular that the
Court affirm Judge Croft's ruling that the plaintiffs were
without standing to.bring the action. Again this refers to
Judge Croft's ruling in the third Stromquist case.
I would therefore request that the Court review
my brief on the issue of standing and disregard the above
identified references to Judge Croft's deicision in the third
Stromquist case which is not presently before this Court.
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Honorable Richard J. Maughan
Page 2
March 2, 1981
I would like to apologize for the inconvenience
this may cause the Court or to my opposing counsel. The
reference was the result of the fact that I had utilized some
of the reasoning in Judge Croft's decision in the third Stromquist
case in my oral argument previously held before the Court and
had left that decision in my file relative to the cases presently
pending before the Court and upon receipt of the Court's decision,
reviewed my file to prepare the Supplemental Brief and inadvertently
included references to Judge Croft's decision.

If I can be of any further assistance or if any
further explanation is required, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
Best personal regards,
ON, PETERS

B
BTP:jh
cc:

Brian M. Barnard
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD M. STROMQUIST and JANE L.
STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
CLIFFORD COCKAYNE, Salt Lake County
Assessor, JAMES C. SNOW, Salt Lake
County Auditor, ARTHUR L. MONSON,
Salt Lake County Treasurer, WILLIAM
DUNN, Salt Lake County Commissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake County
Commissioner, and PETE KUTULAS, Salt
Lake County Commissioner,

Case No. 16790

Defendants-Respondents.
DONALD M. STROMQUIST and JANE L.
STROMQUIST,

v.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

MILTON YORGASON, Salt Lake County
Assessor, ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake
County Treasurer, WILLIAM DUNN,
Salt Lake County Commissioner, ROBERT
SALTER, Salt Lake County Commissioner,

Case No. 16919

Defendants-Respondents.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSES OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
This brief is submitted pursuant to the Order of
the Supreme Court set forth in its Per Curiam Decision filed
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February 9, 1981 directing the parties to file supplemental
briefs on the issue of Plaintiff's standing to bring the
action.
Pursuant to the Court's directive, this brief is
supplemental in nature and therefore, Respondents depart
from the usual format set forth in the Rules of Civil
Procedure for preparing and filing an appellate brief and
reference is made to the brief previously filed by the
Respondents in this case for compliance with the requirement
that there be a Statement of the Nature of the case, the
Disposition in the Lower Court, the Relief Sought on appeal,
and the Statement.of Facts.

The further briefing requested

by the court concerning the issue of standing is herewith
submitted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE PLAINTIFFS WERE WITHOUT STANDING TO BRING THE
ACTION AND THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
THEREFORE BE AFFIRMED
Plaintiffs-Appellants in their Complaints for
Mandamus and Declaratory Relief for the years 1978 and 1979
did not allege any direct or indirect injury by the actions·
complained of.

Indeed, there is no such injury.
-2-
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Plaintiffs-Appellants, in their Complaint, do not allege or
establish any immediate threat of harm.
threat of harm.

There is no such

They do not allege or establish injury to

any legally protectible interest particular to theme

There

is no interest peculiar to them.
As was stated by Judge Croft, in his decision:
"No facts are alleged to support this conclusion
and none of the grounds set forth in Rule 65A{e)
for injunctive relief are apparent in the pleadings.
There is no allegation of any injury or damages to
plaintiffs set forth in the Complaint."
Further,
"Plaintiffs by their Complaint are seeking to compel County officers to comply with statutory provisions with no allegation of facts showing that they
are not doing so."
In Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City, 531 P.2d
866 (Utah 1975) this Court set forth the requirements that
must be met in order to state a cause of action.
"A party maintaining an action under the Declaratory Judgments Act must have a substantial interest
or a legally protectible interest in the subject
matter of the litigation. The Complaint fails to
allege that the plaintiff has a legally protectible
interest in the contract which is the subject
matter of the action.
It thus appears that the
plaintiff does not present a justifiable issue for
determination by the Court." (emphasis supplied)
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In this case, there is no justifiable issue for judicial
determination.

Plaintiffs did not allege any direct or

indirect injury resulting from the actions complained of.
Plaintiffs did not allege or show any immediate threat of
harm.

They did not allege or assert any injury to any per-

sonal or private legally protected interest that is peculiar
to them.

Indeed, there is no injury.

of damage that they would suffer.

There is no allegation

In Baird v. State, 574

P.2d 713 {Utah 1978) this Court required that a real as
opposed to an academic controversy must exist.
majority opinion,

Justi~e

In the

Maughan made the following

observations:
"There were no concrete facts pleaded indicating any
specific injury sustained or threatened to plaintiff personally. There were no allegations that
plaintiff had sustained a particularized injury
that set him apart from the public generally and
would give him standing to challenge the constitutionality of the act."
No such particularized injury has been alleged in any of the
actions filed by the Stromquists.

The questions presented

by the Stromquists in their several lawsuits, are purely
abstract and academic.
"The Courts are not a forum for hearing academic
contentions or rendering advisory opinions."
Supra, page 715.
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In order for the court to entertain any action for
declaratory judgment, the following conditions must be met:
"(l) a justiciable controversy;
(2) the interests of the parties must be adverse;
(3) the party seeking such relief must have a
legally protectible interest in the
controversy; and
(4) the issues between the parties involved must
be ripe for judicial determination."
A review of the pleadings in the cases presently before the
Court will clearly demonstrate that the Strornquists have
failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy any one of the
four requirements set forth above.
The Stromquists in their Complaints, seek to compel
county officers to comply with statutory provisions but they
make no allegation of facts in their Complaint to show that
said officers are not complying.

This failure precludes the

Court from entertaining their Complaint.

As was stated by

Justice Maughan in Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, (Utah 1978)
at page 715:

"To invoke judicial power to determine the validity
of executive or legislative action, claimant must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct inJury as a result of
that action.
It is insufficient to assert a
general interest he shares in common with all members of the public, VIZ., a general grievance.

-s-
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To grant standing to a litigant, who cannot
distinguish himself from all citizens, would be a
significant inroad on the representative form of
government, and cast the Courts in the role of
supervising the coordinate branches of government.
It would convert the judiciary into an open forum
for the resolution of political and ideological
disputes about the peformance of government."
(Emphasis supplied)
Judge Croft, in his decision in the instant case, refused to
presume that the county officers would not comply with the
law.

Since the wrong complained of by plaintiffs was not

shown to be peculiar to them but rather, was public in
nature, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiffs had
no standing before the Court and correctly granted
defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

If the wrong complained of

is public in character, as is present in this case, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to disclose a special
injury that affects plaintiff separate and apart from the
other citizens.

This has not been done by the Stromquists.

They therefore have no standing to urge the unlawfulness of
the governmental action.

"It is not the duty of the Court

to sit in judgment upon the action of the legislative branch
of government, except when a litigant claims to be adversely
affected on a particular ground by a legislative act."
Baird v. State, page 717.
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The general rule, as set forth in Baird v. State,
has been followed by this Court in the cases of Jenkins v.
State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978) and Jenkins v. Finlinson,
607 P.2d 239 (Utah 1980), and is the law of this State.
The position adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as
set forth in the four cases cited above has also been
followed in other states.
In Mobile Oil Corporation v. McHenry, 436 P.2d 982
(Kansas, 1968) a taxpayer was seeking mandamus to compel the
performance of certain duties.

The Supreme Court of Kansas,

observed as follows:
"It has been said that Mandamus will not lie
at the instance of a private citizen to compel
the performance of a public duty; that such a
suit must be brought in the name of the State,
and the County Attorney and the Attorney
General are the officers authorized to use the
name of the State in legal proceedings to
enforce the performance of public duties.
Where, however, an individual shows an injury
or interests specific and peculiar to himself,
and not one that he share with the community
in general, the remedy of Mandamus and other
extraordinary remedies are available."
The Mobile Oil case indicates that a taxpayer has
no standing to compel performance of a public duty by a
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public off ical unless the taxpayer can show that he is uniquely hurt by the conduct.

He must show an interest speci-

fic and peculiar to himself.
certainly the taxpayer in the present case cannot
make such a showing.

It is questionable whether or not

these taxpayers allege any injury at all, let alone one that
is peculiar to them.
Supporting the holding in the Mobile Oil case is
some language found in 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 78, Page 661.
It is stated in this paragraph that:
"Where a penalty is payable to the State, it
seems clear that the action therefor should be
brought in the name of the State, unless some
other mode is enacted by statute or
established by custom."
Certainly the plaintiff can make no such showing in
this case.

There is no provision in the applicable statute

which would allow the plaintiff to bring this suit.
In Tabor v. Moore, 503 P.2d 736, (Washington,
1972), the plaintiff sought to compel city and county law
enforcement officials to refrain from an alleged practice of
holding suspects for unreasonable lengths of time.

In
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denying the taxpayers standing to bring the suit, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that:
"In the absence of a special interest in the
outcome of a suit, a condition precedent to
maintaining an action against public officials
for illegal expenditure of funds is that
demand ·be made upon the Attorney General to
institute proceedings to preven the illegal
expenditure of funds." at page 738.

That case is very similar to the one at hand.

The

taxpayers in the instant case allege in effect that certain
funds have been expended illegally.

These plaintiffs claim

that the County Assessor has been paid wages in contravention of statute.

In order to make such a claim, however,

the Supreme Court of Washington stated that the taxpayer
must first make a demand on the Attorney General to enforce
the statutory provisions; and, the Washington Supreme Court
held that without having made such a request, the plaintiff
has no standing to bring an action for Mandamus to compel
the Attorney General to enforce the

provision~

Indeed, the

request of the Attorney General was found to be a condition
precedent to a Mandamus action.
Here the plaintiffs made no such demand on the
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County Attorney or Attorney General.

Therefore, as in

Tabor, this Court should find that the taxpayer has no
standing and must first make the request before bringing the
mandamus action.
In the case of Reiter v. Walgren, 184 P2d 571
(Washington, 1974), the Court announced the same principle
of law which was relied on by the Washington Supreme Court
in Tabor.
however.

The language in Reiter seems to go even further,
The Court in Reiter found that the taxpayer who

had no special interest, and had not made the required
demand on the County Attorney or Attorney General, had no
capacity to sue, as well as no standing.
In the case of Austin v. Campbell, 370 P2d 769
(Arizona, 1962), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a state
statute which required such a request on the Attorney
General before instigating suit was a jurisdictional
requirement.

A Court exceeded its jurisdiction if it con-

sidered a suit brought to compel official action where the
required request had not been made.
Finally, in the case of Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P2d
818 (Utah, 1951), the Utah Supreme Court held that a tax-
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payer can maintain an action to question an appropriation
under an unconsitutional statute only when he has shown a
pecuniary interest.

No such interest exists or was alleged

in the instant case.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, that Judge Croft, in
the second Stromquist case, correctly ruled that the
plaintiff-appellants were without standing to bring the
action.

His legal conclusions are supported by the deci-

sions of this Court, Courts from other jurisdictions, and
the decisions of the trial courts should

therefo~e

be

affirmed.

~

DATED this 2Z._~day of February, 1981.
THEODORE L. CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney

0 s
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Defendant-Respondents
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